Gafgyt Malware Broadens Its Scope in Recent Attacks

The Gafgyt malware attack begins with the exploitation of misconfigured Docker Remote API servers, allowing attackers to gain initial access and deploy malicious containers. BlueRock's Container Capability Control effectively mitigates this step by ensuring that only containers with specified capabilities are permitted to run, thereby preventing the deployment of unauthorized or malicious containers like those used in the Gafgyt attack. Once the container is deployed, the attacker attempts to escalate privileges by using 'chroot' and 'bind' to mount the host's root directory, potentially gaining control over the host system. BlueRock's Container Runtime Socket Protection (Available 2024 Dec) further secures this environment by restricting container capabilities, thus preventing unauthorized access to the host's filesystem and thwarting privilege escalation attempts. These mechanisms collectively ensure that the deployment and execution of malicious containers are effectively controlled and monitored, significantly reducing the risk of such attacks.

• T1133: External Remote Services: The attackers targeted misconfigured Docker Remote API servers to spread the Gafgyt malware. This indicates that the attackers gained initial access through exploiting external remote services that were improperly secured, allowing them to connect to and manipulate these services remotely.
• T1610: Deploy Container: The attackers deployed the Gafgyt malware by creating a Docker container using a legitimate 'alpine' docker image. This shows the use of the 'Deploy Container' technique, where the attacker utilizes containerization to execute their malicious payload.
• T1611: Escape to Host: The article mentions that the attacker used 'chroot' and 'Binds' to mount the host's root directory to the /mnt directory inside the container. This allowed the container to access and modify the host's filesystem, representing a privilege escalation through escaping the container to the host.
• T1059.004: Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell: The attackers downloaded the Gafgyt botnet binary as a file named 'rbot' and executed it. This action is an example of using a command and scripting interpreter, specifically a Unix shell, to execute commands on the compromised system.
• T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer: The article describes the attacker downloading the Gafgyt botnet binary from a remote location to the Docker container. This process involves transferring tools or payloads into a compromised environment, aligning with the 'Ingress Tool Transfer' technique.
• T1071: Application Layer Protocol: The Gafgyt malware communicates with a command-and-control server using hardcoded IP addresses and ports. This is indicative of the 'Application Layer Protocol' technique, where malware uses standard protocols to communicate with its C2 infrastructure.
• T1016: System Network Configuration Discovery: The Gafgyt malware performs a network discovery action by determining the local IP address of the victim host using Google's DNS server. This aligns with the 'System Network Configuration Discovery' technique, where the malware gathers information about the network interfaces and configurations.
• T1498: Network Denial of Service: The primary impact of the Gafgyt malware deployment is launching distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks using various protocols like UDP, TCP, and HTTP. This represents the 'Network Denial of Service' technique, where the goal is to disrupt the availability of targeted systems or networks.